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Balancing Trade-Offs between Policy Responsiveness and 
Effectiveness: The Impact of Vertical Policy-Process 
Integration on Policy Accumulation
Abstract: In modern democracies, policy stocks pile up over time. In many ways policy accumulation reflects 
societal modernization and progress. However, if policy accumulation is not matched by corresponding expansions 
in administrative capacities necessary for policy implementation, a negative trade-off between responsiveness and 
policy effectiveness evolves. We argue that aligning policy formulation and implementation activities through 
vertical policy-process integration (VPI) may curb policy accumulation towards a more sustainable level. Our 
conceptualization of VPI builds upon the distinction of two dimensions: (1) bottom-up integration affecting 
policy design and improving policies’ effectiveness and (2) top-down integration concerning the allocation of 
implementation costs and, hence, constraining responsiveness incentives. It is the central aim of this viewpoint to 
raise awareness about the importance of VPI as a potential way out of the responsiveness trap that threatens modern 
democracies.
Evidence for Practice
• Administrators have to deal with ever-more implementation tasks induced by policy accumulation. This 
bears the risk of systematic implementation deficits and thus ineffective policies.
• From this perspective, it is highly important to identify and develop mechanisms that allow for sustaining 
the process of policy accumulation. We argue that this can be achieved by the integration of policy 
formulators into the implementation process as well as by involving policy implementers in policy-making.
• The concept proposed in this paper can serve decision-makers as a yardstick to determine the degree 
of vertical integration among policy formulators and implementers and to identify areas for future 
improvement and organizational reform.
Introduction
It is a major asset of democratic governments that they are responsive to societal demands. Citizens and interest groups claim cleaner 
environments, better social protection and education, 
more transparency, or more individual freedoms. 
Governments typically respond to these demands by 
adopting new policy outputs, in the form of laws, 
regulations, or programs. As established policies 
are terminated only rarely (Bardach 1976), policy 
outputs pile up over time. Policy accumulation hence 
constitutes a central, yet largely unexplored feature of 
modern democracies.
In many ways, policy accumulation reflects societal 
modernization and progress. Most citizens are happy 
not to live in a country that still trusts in the social 
policies of the 1870s, or the environmental policies of 
the 1950s. Yet, merely adopting new policies reflects 
nothing but symbolic politics if these measures are not 
effective in addressing the problems for which they 
were designed. There are potential trade-offs between 
policy responsiveness and policy effectiveness. The 
more governments respond to societal demands via 
policy accumulation, the more they might overburden 
implementation bodies with ever-more and 
increasingly complex policies (Limberg et al. 2020). 
This, in turn, has the potential to undermine the 
long-term support for governmental intervention 
(Keiser and Miller 2020).
Theoretically, there are three ways to escape from 
this “responsiveness trap” (Adam et al. 2019). First, 
citizens can reduce their expectations vis-à-vis the 
government. Yet, this is an unlikely scenario. Public 
opinion data suggest that citizens have a rather 
“schizophrenic” view on the government (ibid., 
2019: 35). While people are generally critical of 
governmental intervention, they tend to be quite 
demanding when it comes to solving concrete policy 
problems such as healthcare, the provision of decent 
housing, or the imposition of strict environmental 
legislation. Second, governments might avoid the 





Yves Steinebach is Assistant Professor of 
Political Science and Public Administration 
at LMU Munich.
Christina Steinbacher is doctoral 
researcher at LMU Munich.
Christoph Knill is Full Professor of Political 
Science and Public Administration at LMU 




2 Public Administration Review • xxxx | xxxx 2020
capacities along with growing implementation burdens emerging 
from policy accumulation. Unfortunately, also this option is hardly 
realistic. Most governments face fundamental fiscal and ideological 
constraints for public sector expansions in times of globalized 
financial markets, austerity, and still reverberating ideas of New 
Public Management (Lobao et al. 2018). The remaining third 
option is that governments manage to keep policy accumulation at a 
sustainable level. Sustainable accumulation means that governments 
respond responsibly to the constant demand for new policies. In 
concrete terms, this implies that policy growth rates are kept as 
low as possible while at the same time existing implementation 
capacities are allocated as efficiently and purposefully as possible.
Achieving this objective and avoiding excessive accumulation is 
anything but easy. The central challenge is that, in many instances, 
there is a division of labor between the sectoral bureaucracies 
in charge of policy formulation and those in charge of policy 
implementation. On the one hand, there are bureaucracies—
typically at the ministerial level—that are responsible for drafting 
new policies in response to political or societal demands. It is in the 
very interest of these bureaucracies to expand their competences 
and strengthen their institutional status by constantly producing 
new policy proposals. On the other hand, and in contrast to the 
ministerial level where policies are off the table, once they are 
adopted, the burden to implement these policies accumulates at the 
“street level,” i.e., at the desks of people working in implementing 
bodies and executive agencies.
We argue that structural capacities for integrating the processes 
of policy production and implementation play a decisive role for 
bridging the gap between responsive and effective policy-making. 
These patterns of vertical policy-process integration (VPI) might 
vary not only across countries but also across policy sectors. There 
are two dimensions of institutionalized feedback and exchange 
through which VPI might contribute to avoid excessive policy 
accumulation. The first dimension—bottom-up integration—
captures the volume of the “voice” that implementation bodies have 
in policy formulation, in particular with regard to their experience 
with design flaws of existing policies. This way, VPI reduces the 
risk that ever-new policies are needed to compensate for the deficits 
of the policies already in place. The second dimension—top-down 
integration—refers to the extent to which the implementation 
costs are internalized in the process of policy formulation. To what 
extent do bureaucracies that produce policies also have to bear the 
cost for implementing these measures? In short: Well-integrated 
bureaucracies should not only produce fewer policies but also need 
fewer new policies than administrations that lack effective VPI.
How Policy Accumulation Undermines Policy 
Effectiveness
In the comparative public policy and public administration literature, 
the phenomenon of policy accumulation appeared on the analytical 
radar only recently. The dominant focus of research has been on 
describing and explaining instances of individual policy change 
and implementation (Knill and Tosun 2020). Despite this general 
assessment, there is broad scholarly agreement that policy stocks in 
modern democracies are continuously growing, regardless of the policy 
area or country under study. There are a number of publications 
pointing to the prevalence of accumulation patterns, emphasizing 
widespread and densely populated “policyscapes” (Mettler 2016), as 
well as layered and increasingly complex mixes of policy instruments 
and targets (Thelen 2004). In short, policy accumulation is an 
undisputed phenomenon. It occurs whenever the rate of policy 
production exceeds the rate of policy termination (Adam et al. 2019).
The negative consequences of accumulation for the effectiveness 
of public policies are also undisputed. On the one hand, policy 
accumulation inevitably creates complex policy mixes, challenging 
the coherence and consistency of the policy measures taken (Howlett 
and Rayner 2007). On the other hand, policy accumulation 
directly translates into increased implementation burdens. Policy 
accumulation should hence—in principle—come along with the 
simultaneous expansion of administrative capacities in terms of 
additional infrastructure, budget, and personnel. Otherwise, new 
policies are likely to be implemented only deficiently, or their 
(proper) implementation might create negative trade-offs for the 
implementation of already existing ones (Tummers et al. 2015).
While the problems emerging from policy accumulation are well 
acknowledged, we lack concepts and theories that help us to 
understand how democracies could strike a sustainable balance 
between policy responsiveness and policy effectiveness. Apart from 
vague recommendations to craft and adopt “‘carefully designed 
governance arrangements” on a case-by-case basis (Howlett and 
Rayner 2007), it is striking that there has been only limited 
academic interest in addressing the factors that allow government to 
forge a more sustainable path towards policy-making. To address this 
research gap, we focus on the systemic features of political systems, 
i.e., the structural preconditions that ensure or inhibit effective 
integration of processes of policy formulation and implementation.
Bridging the Gap between Policy-Formulating and 
Policy-Implementing Bureaucracies
We argue that, in order to understand and, if necessary, reduce 
the level of policy accumulation, attention needs to be paid to 
arrangements that shape the interactions between administrative 
bodies responsible for policy formulation (mainly ministerial 
bureaucracies) and those in charge of policy implementation 
(mainly administrative authorities and agencies) at different 
institutional levels. We refer to these arrangements as vertical policy-
process integration (VPI). While the idea of VPI is not entirely 
new and has been emphasized as a precondition to ensure policy 
effectiveness (Trein and Maggetti 2020), we still lack a conceptual 
specification of how VPI can be assessed empirically.
In response to this problem we suggest two VPI dimensions to 
capture the extent to which governments can avoid excessive 
policy accumulation. The bottom-up dimension of VPI refers to 
the implementation level’s influence on policy design. The top-
down dimension of VPI captures the extent to which bureaucracies 
involved in policy formulation also have to carry the costs of 
implementing these policies (see figure 1).
Policy Design and Bottom-Up Integration
There are numerous reasons why policies might fail and not achieve 
their intended results. Policies might suffer from design flaws such as 
overly ambiguous policy objectives (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984), 
faulty assessments of the nature of the policy problem at hand 
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(Linder and Peters 1987), or wrong assumptions about means–ends 
relationships (Schneider and Ingram 1997). Moreover, governments 
might not possess the capacities required by a given policy 
instrument (Howlett and Ramesh 2016). While all these design 
flaws are created during the policy formulation process, they can 
only be identified at the implementation stage, i.e., by implementing 
bodies who encounter in their daily work that there are discrepancies 
between the policies’ intentions and the actual situation.
Effective policy design hence depends on the flow of information 
from the bottom (the administrative authorities and agencies in 
charge of implementation) to the top (governmental bureaucracies 
responsible for policy formulation). Yet, what sounds obvious in 
the first place is a demanding endeavor in the context of highly 
differentiated administrative systems. We argue that there are in 
particular three aspects determining the implementation level’s 
capacity to effectively participate in the policy-making process. 
These are (1) articulation, (2) consultation, and (3) evaluation.
First, articulation refers to the extent to which the different agencies 
in charge of implementation of sectoral policies are able to develop 
clear and coherent positions on their preferred policy design options 
and their evaluation of previous policies (Elmore 1978). Articulation 
presumes a minimum level of organizational integration across different 
implementation bodies, for instance, the existence of associations of 
local or regional authorities that represent the interests of lower levels of 
government in central policy-making. Second, for effective bottom-up 
integration it is essential not only that the implementing level speaks 
with one voice, but also that this voice is heard, i.e., actually integrated 
into the policy formulation process. The extent to which this is the 
case depends on the development of consultation procedures in which 
implementation bodies can present their concerns and positions 
to the bureaucracies in charge of designing new policy proposals. 
Third, the chance for learning from implementers’ policy experience 
further increases if policy design is based on both ex ante and ex post 
policy evaluation. Yet, while systematic policy evaluation has gained 
prominence over the last decades, the extent of its application varies 
considerably across countries (Head 2016).
Implementation Burdens and Top-Down Integration
Policy outputs do not make a difference per se. To effectively 
change and shape the behavior of target groups, policies also need 
to be adequately applied in practice. Thus, any policy comes along 
with considerable burdens for implementation. Administrative 
bodies and procedures must be set up for delivering services or 
for controlling and sanctioning policy compliance. Moreover, 
implementation bodies must be equipped with the necessary 
financial and personnel resources to pursue their (new) tasks.
Given that policy formulation and implementation are often 
located at different levels and places of government, there is a 
general risk that costs and benefits of new policies are “decoupled”: 
Whilst the level in charge of policy formulation may benefit from 
demonstrating responsiveness to societal demands, the burden for 
applying and enforcing these new measures accumulates at the 
implementation level. In such constellations, the bureaucracies 
responsible for policy formulation face few limitations to constantly 
produce new policies. Yet, in political reality, free lunches are usually 
rare. To what extent though does the formulation level also have 
to bear the costs of implementation to enable implementation 
bodies to deal with accumulating administrative burdens? These 
costs can be captured by three aspects: (1) formal accountability, (2) 
administrative resources, and (3) organization.
First, the bodies in charge of policy formulation might be formally 
accountable for the activities of implementation bodies and thus 
have to carry the costs of legal oversight. In addition to merely 
checking whether implementation bodies comply with the law, 
control might also entail technical–administrative supervision, i.e., 
control of the appropriateness of organizational arrangements at 
the implementation level. Second, implementation comes along 
with administrative and policy costs. Direct costs of polices, e.g., 
the costs of child benefits, must be accounted for; implementers 
must be trained, employed, and equipped. If the bureaucracies in 
charge of policy formulation have to bear such costs, they have 
lower incentives to constantly produce new policies, as resources are 
limited. A third form of implementation costs refers to the efforts 
involved in the organization of implementation structures. Which 
bodies should be in charge of implementation? Is it advisable to 
delegate the implementation task to several agencies? While these 
aspects constitute (at best) “second-order” issues in the public 
debate, they are crucial for ensuring the proper functioning of 
public policies (Steinebach 2019). In general, top-down integration 
is more pronounced when the costs of organizing implementation 
structures rest with the level in charge of policy formulation.
The Impact of VPI on Policy Accumulation: Four Ideal-
Type Scenarios
In the previous sections, we distinguished between two dimensions 
of VPI: bottom-up and top-down integration. The bottom-up 
dimension is expected to slow down policy accumulation through the 
production of better policies. Better policy design means less need for 
ever-new measures to correct design errors of existing policies. The 
top-down dimension, in turn, captures the extent to which policy 
producers have to bear the costs of policy implementation, hence 
slowing down policy accumulation via the “cost brake.” Depending 
on the extent to which VPI on these two dimensions is pronounced 
we can identify four ideal-type patterns (see table 1).
Figure 1 Theoretical Considerations on VPI and Policy 
Accumulation
Table 1 Types of VPI and Expected Levels of Policy Accumulation
Top-down integration
Low High
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In scenario 1, the overall level of VPI is low. The policy formulation 
level can easily “afford” to be (over)responsive to political and societal 
demands as implementation costs are not internalized in the process 
of policy formulation; i.e., policy formulation bodies have a rather 
free lunch with regard to the implementation costs of the policies they 
produce. At the same time, lacking bottom-up integration means that 
policy design does not benefit from experience and feedback gained 
at the implementation level. This increases the probability that policy 
design is (largely) ineffective. Accordingly, ever-more policies might 
be needed to correct for the flaws of existing ones. The combination 
of low design quality and low internalization of implementation costs 
is likely to result in rampant policy accumulation that quickly exceeds 
the available administrative capacities.
Scenario 2, by contrast, constitutes the exactly opposite scenario. 
Strong top-down integration implies that the bureaucracies in charge 
of policy formulation have to bear the costs of implementing these 
policies. This poses severe constraints on swift policy adoptions. 
Moreover, bottom-up integration will positively affect overall policy 
design quality. Both aspects contribute to keeping policy accumulation 
at a sustainable level. Here, it is most likely that the administrative 
resources can keep up with the level of policy accumulation.
Scenario 3 can be located between these two extremes: Here, we only 
find integration along one of the two dimensions, i.e. either from the 
top to the bottom, or vice versa. In these constellations, we expect 
a less drastic form of policy accumulation compared with situations 
in which VPI is completely absent. Yet, given that only one of the 
two “brakes” on policy accumulation applies, there is an insidious 
danger that policy accumulation and administrative capacities for 
implementation could steadily loose balance. While we thus expect 
more or less the same outcome when either top-down or bottom-up 
integration is missing, the problem diagnosis differs between the two 
constellations. In the lower-left cell, sustainable policy accumulation 
is best achieved by the internalization of implementation costs in 
policy formulation. In the upper-right cell, by contrast, decision-
makers should look for a way to provide a stronger “voice” for the 
implementers in the policy-formulation process.
Outlook: Implementing VPI
We have presented VPI as a potential way out of the responsiveness 
trap that threatens modern democracies. But how can the necessary 
reforms be best achieved in practice? Molenveld et al. (2020) 
highlight that policy implementers principally perceive top-down 
mechanisms as ineffective to achieve successful coordination. Rather, 
they ask for adaptive arrangements and deliberative processes. Thus, 
a first step in the right direction seems to look for informal ways and 
venues that include the policy-implementing level more strongly 
in the process of policy formulation. Moreover, any improvement 
of VPI along these lines requires that practitioners—at all levels 
of government—are fully aware of the negative consequences 
associated with deficient VPI. It was the central objective of this 
viewpoint article to raise this awareness.
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